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Il: TliE SUPP.HIE COUP,T OF THE STATE OF UTAH
·M ,\:;1y 1:J1.T:0t::.L
'.'t1,\:'.Y'

rnsur""r:cE

Plaintiff-Respondent,
tJo.

OCC

18964

FIRE i'.l:D CASUALTY

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPOEDEUT
tlATUirn OF TllE CASE

This is a declaratory action to deteruine which
conpany provided prinary coverage
d

the claio asserted for person-

injuries in Hm.1croft v. Bisel, Civil tlo. 78-5021.

The Eowcroft

suit was settled out of court for a total sun of $150,000.00.
Guaranty National Insurance Company paid its policy limits under
protest and Occidental Fire and Casualty Company paid the balance of
the settleoent.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Both parties filed motions for sumnary judgoent based on
stipulated facts.

The Honorable Phillip R. Fishler, Third Judicial

Cuurt, grar.ted pli!intiff's ootion and held the Occidental Fire and

Casualty

p•.'J

lC'

p -;._- n, t L. ':

Bise:;_ as

,

:c: :: L- r ·- ;

1

t

pl

P j

n· ; •

I ' ,•

r ,1 L _

sunnJr:/ judgnl'nt.

r'.E'...I EF SGUClcT or: P.F'PEAL
Plo.intiff-Lespcnde:tt, Guaranty i 1 cttional Insur,Jncc

seeks to have the lower court judgoent aifiroed.

ISSUES
1.

\Thether princiry cover2ge for a tractor-trJ.:..lcr u'"._

lease, driven bv the mmer-lessor, is provided bu the insurer
the lessor or that of the lessee.
\i'hether in a declaratory actio;-i bet\leen tun
coopanies, after the injured third-partv's clain has been satiE
I.C.C. regulations negate the insurance contract provisions o:

whether ge;ieral insurance contract principles are deterninctive
coverage.

FACTS

On July 17, 1978 Dclov Bisel drove hjs Intcn1ation.":
tractor and duop trailer into an intersection
autonobilc driven by llrs. Brenda lioucroft.

P..s

2'.1d
;_i

ccillidc'l\
:-csult

accident, tirs. Howcroft and her tuo childreil 1Jc:re injured.

i;;I
t't

1

,

,\t

'Ile ciccident, tir.

Bisel and his truck 'Jere under lease to

.cl 1c«1nsportatio01 Conpanv.

(P.. 91-92)

Bisel and his trcictor-trailer were insured under an
1

c.:ci0cntai Fire and Casualty Conpany policy nunber CA 21-57-74
in 1977, uhich ''as in effect on July 17, 1978.

That policy

cunlicins the following pertinent provisions and endorsenents.
INSURrnG AGREEliENTS

III.

Definition of Insured:
(a) \Jith respect to the insurance
for bodily injury liability, the unqualified word "insured" includes the naoed
insured and . . . any person or organization legally responsible for the use
thereof, provided the actual use
the
autonobile is by the named insured or
such spouse or with the pernission of
either. (R. 7)

or

LONGHAUL TRUCK11EN ENDORSEMENT

3.
Other Insurance: \Jith respect to any
automobile of the coomercial type uhile
leased or loaned to an; person or orgauiza tion, other than the naoed insured,
engaged in the business of transporting
property by automobile for others, or any
hired private passenger automobile insured on the "cost of hire" basis, or any
non-owned automobile, this insurance
shall be excess over any other valid and
collectible insurance. (R. 13) (enphasis added)

On July 17, 1978, Norwood Transportation was insured under
an autonobile liability policy nunber GLA 0022857 issued by Guaranty
tlational Insurance CoEip;:my.

That policy contains the follouing

pPrtinent provisions and endorsenents:
PERSOtlS rnsur,ED .

.

.

a)
The named insured;
b)
Any partner or executive officer
thereof

3

c)
CH·J11t:'

An'r other person 1vh'.1c:
d ,jut Ot:iu 1.J :_ l L' (' r d t

sr:_tutL

01

ri.Jr.icJ

11it/1

t

1::;;n'.'.
'i-:.

c·

"'

','

l;
1

J)

J -

11[

TP.l'Ct'.:1Li
2.)

b)
providc:d, hm1ever, a
ur
other person '.'urnishcd to the n.21;1cd inwith ar ctUt0nobilc hi:·ecl
the
nancd insured shall be deencd
to be
an enplovee of Ehc naned inaurcd.
cl) 1:ith respect to (1)
(2)
(3)
any non-o,,.med autonohile, the insurance under this endorsement shall
be excess insurance over anv other valid
and col:ectible insurance, \1hether primary, eYcess or contingent, fiVailable
to the insured. (emphasis added, P.. '.'.9)

POillT I
t;E:::THER THE I. C. C. REGULATIOUS OR EtlDOP,SEhFJiTS tiOL
THEIR UllDERLYI!;c PUBLIC POLICY tlEGATE THE PP.OVISIOt:s
OF THE rnsURA!lCE POLICIES rn THIS CASE.

At the tine of the Bisel-Howcroft collision Appellant
conbination automobile policy number CA 21-57-75, purchased bv
Bisel in 1977, was in full force and effect.

Bisel purchased

t'.

policy to cover his tractor-trailer and liability arising
use.

In the suit that arose from the Bisel-Howcroft accident,

Appellant refused to defend and cover Bisel except to provic'e e··
coverage.
In Utah,

the courts h2ve tr2.ditionall•1 held that

rr:·

coverage is provided by the vehicle 01mer' s policy covcrinz the

4

Llntional Faroer's

Propertv and Casualtv Co. vs.

,, _bsurar,c<e Grouu, 14 Utah2d 89, 377 P.2d 786 (1963);
i,:-:c-tL!lc;c:n v. Faroers :nsurance Exchange, 21 Utah2d 194, 443 P.2d
105

(

1968).

Judge Fishler, 3n experienced insurance lawyer hinself,

rc:cognized the Utah position in holding Appellant's policy prioary.
Appellant seeks r.ow to circuovent the Utah principle and
the risks it specifically contracted to insure, to Respondent.
That would result i'1 forcing Respondc=nt to cover Bisel, whor;i it
contracted to exclude.

Such a result is contrary not only

to the recognized Utah position regarding prioary coverage, but also
the public policy of freedoo to contract

2.llocate risks which

underlies all contract lau.

The issue of prir;iary versus excess coverage in truck-lease
situations is one which has been frequently litigated and as Appellant points out in its brief, has given rise to two distinct legal
theories. Appellant cites Transport Indeonity Co. v. Carolina
Casualtv Co., 652 P.2d 134 (Ariz. 1982) as the better reasoned position, holding the lessee's insurance policy priaary because the
required I.C.C. endorseaent nullified the excess provision that
otherwise oay have relieved Transport Indeanity of liability.

The

Transport case can and should be distinguished on a crucial fact.
Tl1ere the parties had been unable to reach an agreement as to who
1Jould defend acid settle the underlying tort clail'.l prior to filing
their declaratory action.

It is that specific situation that the

I.C.C. regulations at issue here, were intended to prevent.
5

In the

t:1._Y;:.-t

l pcd i1.2·

i_r·c·

li:--1i :._

'uL". '-1r\..'.

:

L.:l:

prt:>

Jccldr2tory 2ction.
On these

::1ci;_-s,

I.C.C. rcgulatiur;s

have he.
policy prt_.-v::_:;i_,H-:s only in disputL

o: the spec i :f i c po 1 ic:r provis ior

b et1.112c1-:. insu:-2r s th'2

govern.

c_:.

PJcific [:(1cicn2l Insurarccc Cu. "· Tr2.nsport Indeonit·.·

341 F.:'d 514 (8th Cir.

1965); llational t1utual Insurance Co. v.

Libert•r riutual Co., 196 F.'.'d 597 (D.C. Cir.

1952); Carolina Ca:

Ins. Co. v. PenEs·!lvJnia Threshernan and Farners llutuJl Casual·
Ins. Co.

3'.'7 F.2d

(3d Cir.

Ins. Co., 496 F.2d 191 (3th Cir.

1964); \ielloan v. Libertv :iuttei
1974); a'1d Carolina Casualtv

:ns. Co. o:': :Jorc:h Aocrica, 595 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1979).
Respondent argues that based on the facts of the pres.
case, the Transport Indel!lnitv case is not applicable.
lioited to its own facts,
the controlling

L11J

Even 11hc·

the Tr<insport case is not illustrati 1-.

on this issue <ind does not hold up under ca·

analysis.
The Arizona Suprcoe Cou-::-t based its holdircg, in
on two rationale.

First,

it held that even assuoin8 arguendo •

I.C.C. regulario.-is 2r-e lioi ted in their ef[cct to disputes bet'.
the lessee and oenbers of the public, the lessee's policy is a1
by an endorsement attached to the policy.

6

1he Court stated:

1

. . . The transport policy contains an
e;>d,,r' ooe:c t pr-o,·id i:cg that the body of
the puliC'' (llhich contair_s the ezcessother :_nsura'.',ce clause) ':!..s hE:rebv
amended' so that '.
.no condition,
provis:_on, stipulation, or linitation
contained in the . . . policy . . .
shall relieve [Transport] froo liabilit"
hereunder or froo paynent of any final ·
judgocnt .
. '.
at

,,1,· cc1Jorsccent referrec to is required by I.C.C. regulations, so in
the Arizona Court argued that even if i.C.C. regulations do
l:_nit the policy provisions as to a dispute betueen insurers,
I.C.C. endorsement attached to lessee's polic; does.

In the

preser1t case the endorseoent language quoted above was not part of
the

National policy, but only iopliec by the I.C.C.

In Carolina Casualtv insurance Co. vs. Insurance Coopanu
llorth Anerica, 595 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. lq]8), the Court discussed
the sane issue and concluded:
4 9 U. S . C. § 315 and 4 9 C. F. P,. § 10 4 3. 1 (a) ,
governing insurance and other assurances
of motor carrier's financial responsibility, require only that the carrier give
security to pay any final judgoent recovered against such ootor carrier .
.;
they mention nothing about defense of
actions and nothing about payoent of judgments recovered against other parties such
as lessors . . . . 11or does the I.C.C. endorseoent operate to relieve the lessor
or its insurer of any ultioate financial
claios or judgoents
against them._ . . .

Footnote 36:
In the recent decision of Carolina
Casu2lty Insurance Co. vs. Under11riters
7

Insur u n cc C0 . 5 6 Si f . :' c'. J 0 , _ : ._
Cir.
t
ing 2GouL tLc :.C.C.

( 5 t l1

·L.

The purp()SC ('_,_-

,_•!

Intc2.:":;tate

£'.•::.t

P-.egula_tions i:.;

t,J

L'.-,l_'
Jt.ll
tC'

to ncob<crs o:L ::he ;)Ublic a11d
shippers that a

carrier has

cial responsibili.t•.', 1:ith
the dollar lioits
to pay for losses created bv
its carrier operations. On
the face of the endorseoent
this is accomplished by readout,' other. i::surance',
excess , or sioilar

insofar as the anount available to a third-partv victio
would be reduced.
But there
is no need for or purpose to
be served by this supposed
autooatic extingui3hmert of
the clause insofar as it
effects the insured or other
insurers who clanor £or part
or 211 of the coverage.
Id.
at 139.
The second rationale the Arizona Court adopted 11as th:
even without the I.C.C. endorseoent, the intent of the Interstc'.
Comoerce Act w2s to".

.pen:1it the I.C.C. to abolish and regu.

a wide range of practices 11hich had cone into e;;istence in the
trucking industry by inposing 'responsibility-and-control regulat ions' governing the regulation of non-m.JT,ed vehicles".
65'.' P.2d at 143.

The Court 11ent on to

the conf.ressi(,c

intent, apparently paraphrasing a U.S. Suprcce Court
follovs:

3

Congressional intent included 'fi::ing'
responsibility by adopting
il rule or lau od:ing the lessee liable
for anv negligent act of the driver,
even though he wa.s enplo'red bv the
lessor.
It included
rethat the lessee give proof
ot 11nancial responsibility for its
liabilitv for the acts of the driver.
It
language preventing the
insurer whose policv was filed as
proof of financial responsibility
(Transport in this case) froo relieving itself of its obligation to pay
daoages.
Transamerican Freightlines,
Inc. v. Brada Miller, supra.
(423 U.S. 28, 96 S.Ct. 229, 46 L.Ed.2d
169 (1975)] li_,_ at 144.
Respondent is unable to determine what portion of the
Brada Miller opinion the Arizona Court paraphrased.

In reference to

the intent and purpose of the I.C.C. regulations, the United States
Supreoe Court in the Brada Miller case did oake the following
statement:
After a detailed examination of the proceedings of the Comoission that resulted
in the promulgation of the protective provisions at issue in this case, the Court
observed: 'The purpose of the rules is to
protect the industry from practices detrimental to the maintenance of sound transportation services consistent with the regulatory system,' and to assure safety of the
operation. (citations) 'So the rules in
question are aimed at conditions which oay
directly frustrate the success of the regulation undertaken by Congress.' (citation)
It is apparent, therefore, that the sound
transportation services and the elimination
of the probleo of a transfer of operating
authority, with its attendant difficulties
of enforcing safety requirements and of
fixing financial responsibility for daoage
and injuries to shippers and meobers of the

9

public, 1,vere the
t d_:_i-1:
"1<1!
posts in the d c v c:
t u [ th'" ,_
ru l c: s . 4 3 CS .
G,
7 , 9 6 S . Ct .
, _ ) '--!
46 L.Ed.'.'d 160, (1')75) qu.Jli:1g
Truck in? As.::; uc ia t iun s vs. l':1 it t'.
344 C.S. 29(,, 73 S.Ct. 307, S7 L.t:u. 337
(1953) (cnphasis c:cide<l).

Fror.i this languci_ge appci_rentl;1, the i\rizoiw Suprene Court k 1 s ;""
to the conclusion that congress
prir.iary as a oatter of law.

the lessee's policy t1

The Court cit2s no 8uthorit;r, ot'. 1, :

than the Brada tliller case to support its co;-iclusion.

Incecd, t'

Arizona Court acknouledges that the conclusion thev reach, citec
Appellant's brief at 8, is the r.iinority view.

652 p. '.'d

ci_t

143.

Respondent asserts the Ilrada Miller cc:se c'oes not SUP?'
the Arizona Supreme Cou:rt an2_l;rsis :wr does it suprcrt AppellcM'

contention in the

case.

In tLe

ililler opinion, t'oe

U.S. Suprer.1e Court went no further than to state that ar.iong othE:
considerations "fixing financial reSjJOnsibility for danages and
injuries to shippers and oer.ibers of the public, were significant
aios and guideposts in the developrnent of the cor.1prehensive rules

423 U.S. at 37.

In fact,

the Court upheld an indennification

provision that the lessor "save harmless" the lessee.

The Court

specifically pointed out that the lessee had defended and
the underlying tort claim and then held:
The [I.C.C.] regulations do ::ot e::pressly prohibit an inder:mificatinn provisi0:1
in the agreenent between
lessor and
the lessee.
In fact, thev neither sacctinn
nor forbid it.
It would
to follow,
then, that the I'.lere presence of a clause
such as the one here - that the lessor
10

is to bear the burden of its o'm negli-

geTlce - do2s not,

?f fcnd

i:1 and o:': itself,

the regulations so long as the
.cssee does not absolve itself froo the
auties to the public and to the shinpers
j,._1220 sed upon it bv the Cooois s icm' s regulations
Although one part•r is required by lm1 to
have control and responsibilitv for conditions of the vehicle, and to bear the
consequences of any negligence, the party
responsible in the law to the ir.jured or
daoilged person oay seek indeonity froo
the party responsible in fact.
423 V.S.
at 39 and 40. (eophasis added)
It is clear that the U.S. Supreoe Court

the I.C.C.

regulations as intended to provide a source of coopensation for
sh'..!'pcrs ccnd injured thirc-po.rties in trip-lc:isc circu.-ist3nc12s.

The

Court does not hold or ioply, as the Transport Indemnit'' case
suggests, that the registered ootor carrier's insurance provide
absolute and exclusive primary coverage.
The Brada lliller case suggests rather, that as long as the
tort claioant is coopensated, valid provisions within the competing
insurance policies will be given effect.

As noted earlier, in the

!_r_a.21sport Indeonity case, both insurers had refused to defend or
settle the underlying tort claio at the tioe the Arizona Suprene
Court heard the case.

In an effort to prevent that very situation,

thtc court o.dopted the policy "establishing a unifon:i rule fixinp,
prir.io.ry financial responsibility for defense and payoent of clains
in all cases involving trip leases".
then lioited its holding:

11

652 P.2d at 144.

The Court

\,le de) nut

go s(_)

;: c: de r l l (l T_,J i :--: p (i1:.surt-r the

lessee

s

s u ('
(1f

t,_,
l

I

h

t

I_

l ,_' ')

"1 \

up1..):: t:h: t1·::._-r"'·2-:
:i._11su::._·a::cc C\lnt:.:nct.

there nav be

(Jtl1er

'.L
...

bt:

_,llI"-2

or the
(citation)
f icCl.tion

,1s

L'

__:; bct•.-,'l:'Cf".

l_cssor,

th1;

(citatiori) \:here
th1.. Se
. . . crhts m"v bt: 12-1 fc1rc:,c1 b·• ''C't"..; 011
or.
actions will not ordinarilv delav
disposition of the tort
bv- enforceocnt of the prioarv liability
which
lessee and
insurer
must bear.
652 P.2d at 145.
1

In practice, houever,
provide a consistent,

tht:: P.rizona Court's atteopt to

rule produces incocsistcnt results.

applied to the facts of ti1c

case, after the tort clain .:.

been settled, the Arizona analysis, holding the lessee's
prioary as a niltter of lau, has the effect of denying r.espondent'
rights to indfilmification and contribution.

A judicial fiat (h2:

either policy is prioary vould render any contribution question ·
between Appellant's and Respondent's insured's noot.
Respondent asserts the best reasoned authority and ana.
sis is Carolina Casualtv Insurance Co. vs.
North Aoerica, 595 F.2d 128 (3d Cir.

Insurance Comcanv of

1978) (hereinafter IllA).

that case the Third Circuit Court addressed the saoP issues as
presented in the instant case and quote0 th<e Eanl' Lrnguuse ,-,-,,r,
Brada Miller case that the Arizona Court quoted in the
Inder.mity opinion, that "fixing financial responsibility for dar
and injuries to .

. oeobers of the public as one of the

12

01ns

i_

, re ui

l

thc::

rules". 595 F. 2ci ;it 137.

The Third

C,iu::t thc:n stJ.ted:

o.ssuoe, 11ithout dcciding, that if
Refrigero.ted, [lessee] as the holder of
the I.C.C. peroit, were the onlv available defendant in this case, it- could
not escape the significant duties of

\ie r:i;:iy

care and financial accountabj_lity to

the public Hhich the Federal P.ules-;-and
the contractual undertakings pursuant
thereto, impose upon lessees. We oay
also assume, without deciding, that
IllA as Refrigeratecl's certified liability insurer could not absolve itself of a duty to nake the initial
payoent of conpensation to an injured
nember oi the public, in the event
that neither Refrigeratecl nor any other
party involved could answer financially
for the danage. The District Court in.
this action nav have intended to state
nothing oore than the above two propositions when it declared that 'Refrigerated and l!JA .
. are in that order
primarily responsible for defending the
Bab cocks' suit anc for paying any daoages the Bab cocks night recover'. lie
agree that these tuo principles are
in accordance with the policy of this
Court. 595 at 137. (enphasis added)
In the INA case, the tort claio had been tried and the
jury found no negligence on the part of the driver, but found both
lessor and lessee independently liable for negligence.

The Court

then stated:
Houover, the pleadings in this declaratory dCtion do not seek a determination
of
duty owed bv a notor-carrier lessee
and its
to.the injured public.
Rather, we view this case in its present
posture as an action to determine Hhere
the ultimate finar.cial responsibility
for the injury rests, after the injured
13
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public prc\·cr:t.:;
n.J;l:1e:: in which
laws r,.;uuld OtherwiSt2

..

l.

t:11_

:L'. •

oL-

11:

chi'

financic:l burden uf th2 iniuc··1. S'JS
at 137 & 138.
·

In the J.ilA cn.se,

counsel for tllc lessc"r, Carolin.::i

Casualtv, presented the s&me argument as does Appellant
the Third Circuit Court rcj ected as :'ollm1s:
Carolina and Stanford appear to argue in
this appeal that our court's
should stop with consideration of. the
!.C.C. regulations and the public policies
serve the!"C:b".
Cc
\:hile a
lessee
free itscff
its fcrlcrall?
inposcd duties when protection of the
·
public is at stake, the federal requirements arc not so radically intrusive as
to absolve lessors or their insurers
of othen1ise existing oblig,itions under
applicable state tort law doctrines or
under contracts allocating financial
risk among private parties.
Thus, in a
declaratorv action sinilar to this one,
determining which of two insurers overl
primary coverage for liability arising
from a leased vehicle accident, this
Court rejected the reasoning of a
District Court which had relied solel"
on the 'responsibility and control'
regulations to impose liability exclusivelv on the lessee's insurer.
Insurance Co. vs. Libert?
l1utua1 Insurance Co. ,
(3rd Cir. 1976).
J:h<tt decision held
that 11here the case is 'concerned 11i th
the responsibilit:: as between insuraT'c"
carriers,' and not \litli the federal
p0licy of protecting the public, 'I.C.C.
considerations arc not rleterninativc'
and a court should consider the express

terns oi the parties' contracts. Id.
at 138.

l cspundcnt has defended and settled the underlying tort
',.

t

i ,,

Lr.r, present case.

In its current posture this action is

to an action for contribution and therefore

muu;1r

above,

r'.

on the

the coverage should be dcteroincd b:•

the express terDs of the t110 policies.
POH;T J:I
UCDER GEt1ERALL Y ACCEPTED :!:tJSURANCE COtlSTRUCTIOtl
PRillCIPLES' OCCIDEUTAL Flr,E Atm CASUALlY COt\PAt1Y
IS THE PP.lliARY HlSURER HAVU1G UAi:ED I;ISH AS
WSURED UtWEP, ITS POUCY, \!HILE THE GUARAUTY
llATIOtiAL rnSURAllCE POLICY EXPRESSLY EXCLUDES BISEL.

After all the snake of :.C.C. regulations and ?Olicy has
\Jec::1 cleared awav,

the only real issue in this case is which insur-

ancc policy covers Deloy Bisel, since llorwood' s liability i f any, is
onl" vic?.rious and therefore tlonwod' s insurer as subrogee would be
entitled to succeed to Norwood's rights of indennification against
or his insurer.
The Occidental policy contains two clauses pertinent to
Ll1is is Gue.

The first is the definition of insured uhich provides

coverage for the nal!1ed insured (Bisel) and "any person or org2.nlegally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual
u;c> c•f the ;iutor.10bile is by the naoed insured . . . ".

(R. 7)

The

"Se Hauling Contract executed by Eisel and Non1ood legally grants
.r-•..:cnJd the right of use and control of the truck during the lease

00riod

paragraph 7; R.

37).

Bisel, the nal!1ed insured, was

15

t\h' tin<c ,,[ thL·

driving the truck

1c·cid<.:r•.r.

polic: .
The

seCOl"'cd

the case is the

11

cl3USE.: in the

IJUlicy pe:_-t:...rlt_;

other

r

under the Lc;ngh;iul

Endorsener.t, uhich provides,

11

\:ith -r-espcc1:

1:::,1

211:' o.uton(1Li:.c (':·

coLITTerc:.:11 type vhile ',,eased o:::- loaned tc any person or cr1:21
izatio:-i,

this insurance shall be c::cess ovc:::- ar.:1 other

and collectible insurance".

(R.

13)

(enphasis ccdced)

language, this clause operates to r:Jc:ke t 112 Occidental po lie.• c::c,

1;,;ben there is other vclid and collectible insurJ.uce 0v2il.0':_
to the insu:ced.
policy extends only e::ces=:

:=or

ccciclent \;hicb occe:-

while the desc:::-ibed ·;chicl2 is '-''ased to a cocnon c2rrier".
lant gives no argunent on appeal that its polic:1 is c:ot
collectible other than "the I.C.C.
policy be prinary."

filing r.1and2.tes that the Gucr

(Appellant Brief c.t 7).

The Guaranty policy c.lso contains an "ey:cess clause" i.
its Truckmen' s Endorseoent which provides, "d. With respect to
(2)

(3) any non-01med autooohile,

this endorsenent shall he excess over any

the insu::-:mce U'«C•.
valid and callee·

ible insur2nce, vhethe:::- pr:!.narv, ey:cess or contii1gcnt,
the insured."

(R. '.'9).

In construing such cocpcting e<cess cl

Couch on Insurance stiltes:

16

1

111er2 an automobile liabilitv oolicv
issued to the ovmer provided' that its
w2s available to
legally responsible :or its operation,
but also provided that coverage should
not
to claims covered bv other
valid insurance and the lessee' of the
car carried insurance under another
policy providing that such insurance
should be merely the excess coverage
over and above the valid and collectible insurance taken out bv the mmer,
such latter insurance is not 'other
valid insurance' so as to affect the
insurance taken out bv the mmer.
(cases cited therein), Couch on
Insurance 2d §62-91, Ettect ot Excess
Insurance Contract, at 569.
According to the "Couch" rule, the e:::cess clause in tt1e
Cui'\r,mt•» t:ational policv renoves it from consic1.cration as "other
valici and collectible insurance" u:-ider the Cccidentsl policy.

Under

this rule the Occidental policy would provide prioary coverage up to
its limits and only then would the Guaranty llational policy provide
coverage.
The Guaranty policy also expressly excludes Bisel fron
coverage under the Truckmen Endorsement:
(b) Except with respect to the named
insured or an employee thereof, but
subject otherwise to the "persons
insured" provision, the insurance
does not cover as an insured an;r
person or
or any agent
or employee thereat engaged in the
business of transporting propertv
by automobile for the named insured
or for others under anv
the following conditio:1s; 1) . . · . , 2) .
3) . . . , 4) . . . provided, hm1ever,
the driver or other person furnished
to the named insured >1ith an autorr.obil2
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hired b·: t 11,, ;1,,r:leLl
deencU :-tllt tu :-iL' an
n'-.lncd -

furni3hed with a hired auton0bile.
enployee and

is r1ot

ilD

L.LJ

t

Sisel is not

\ :.

tn

insureJ.

insured either expressly or
According to the express provisions of the Guarant"
National policy Bisel is not covered as an insured, therefore,
Guaranty national policy is not valid and collectible insuraace
to Bisel Jnd the Occidental excess clause c&nnot operate to dew
coverage to Ei0c: for his l:'.__2bility arisi7'lg fror.i the accident oi

July 17, 1978.

Even if the Court uere to find the excess c

both Trucknen Endorseoents as nutually repugnant and void, the
Occidental policy rcnains the only policy covering Bisel as an
insured and by reason of the oonibus clause in the Occidental

r

naming llorwood as an insured, Occidental is :::he prinary insurer
This is the conclusion reached by the Tenth Circuit ,,
Carolina Casualtv Coopany vs. Trilnsport Indeonit•r Conpanv,
488 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1970).

There the facts were the sane

the instant case e;:cep t both po 1 ic ie s contained I. C. C. endorsec:c
The Court looked be:'ond the 1.C.C. endorser;-,ents and be,,onJ the
provisions to the insurance contracts thensclves and held the
lessor's onnibus clause covered both the lessee nutor carrier•
driver who \Jas an employee or the lessor and spccic:l eopluycc

clic lc_·:_,scc.:' s pu:_icy contained no omnibus clause, and it
t',

,.:ic·.; the

lessee.

The Court further held:

r:o cJ.ses fro1_i this c2-rcuit or froo
Ctah appear to be to the contrarv.
Ringsby (lessee) had full control
over the truck, tractor and trailer,
and over Freeze (driver and lessor's
ernplovee). Ringsby's liability, if
aLy, is vicarious.
If Ringsbv should
be found liable it would have the
rieh t to proceed by iI1deonif ica t ion
against Freeze. As
subrogee, Trw1sport could then sue
a peroissive user UC'.der Carolina's
policy, ultimately recovering against
Carolina. Pased on the above and to
avoid circuity action, ue hold
Carolina's policy (the lessor's policy)
to be prioary.
794.
T11c saoc

would be consistent in the insta1.1t case

: i the Court 11cre to look beyond the I. C. C. endorsement.

To hold

u:herwise uould have the effect of transferring the risk that
Occidental specifically contracted to insure over to Guaranty
National Insurance Company 1fuich specifically contracted to exclude
just such risk.

CONCLUSIOtl
Based on the majority position illustrated by the Carolina
Casuaiy vs. Insurance Cor10an'1 of Uorth Anerica analysis adopted by
tr,e Thic-d Circuit, an I.C.C. endorscoent is not deteroinative of
p<llicv u'vc:rage as between tuo insurance coopanies, \Jhen the
obligation to oDke a third-party whole has been satisfied.
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Federal

the parties contrc1.ct.

f-_;r

vi1:'11

1

insurance contracts thcr.iselvcs.
Fire and Casualty Cor.ipany' s policv, covering Eisel o.s n,<r.iec'. ir_,,,_
and Horwood Tr:msportation as insuYed under tlw or.riihus cLmsc:
prir.iary as opposed to the Guc;rantv tlational insuriL1Ce polic:r iii-.:.
covers only

Transportation and is excess.

The plaintiff-Respondent respectrully subr.iits thc.t tr,,
Third District Court w2s correct in its holding ar.d should the:,,·
be af'.::irned.
r,ESPEC':'FULLY SUB!!ITTED this

Bv

/

7 du.y

of .Ju;ce, 1983.

, DAVID
Attornev for:
Plaintiff-Respondent
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